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1This means that the group using the information can prevent others from using this same information source, but each member does not use
the information in a strategic way against another member. In the course of the paper, we relax the assumption of nonstrategic agent interaction
somewhat by explicitly considering positive and negative network effects (cf. section 3.4).
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Abstract
In this paper, we analyze the value of shared information services, both when they are operated by their
members and when they are implemented by a monopoly provider. The value of information is defined as the
compensating variation in price that makes a risk-averse agent indifferent between procuring an informative
signal or not. We provide investment sharing rules that implement an individually rational Nash bargaining
solution and compare this to the situation in which a nonscreening monopolist maximizes profits. We find that
any efficient price schedule for information should take into account (1) the agents confidence in the signal,
(2) the project risk, (3) the agents risk aversion, as well as (4) her wealth and the mean return if at least one
of them is quite small.  Interestingly, in a cooperative bargaining situation an agents investment share may
either increase or decrease when risk aversion goes up, depending on whether demand for information
decreases faster than implicit bargaining power relative to the other agents or vice versa. We further show that
even for CARA utilities, there are important wealth effects. Our results, including the definition of a critical
Nash network size, provide a benchmark for the value of information that is shared by a group of agents for
use in their respective projects and not employed strategically against each other.
Keywords:  Information networks, shared investment, bargaining, value of information 
1 INTRODUCTION
In the current global networked economy, information sharing has become an imperative. Still, the value of the information to
be shared is often poorly defined and ill-assessed. Much less clear is how much each beneficiary of such shared information ought
to contribute financially in order to at least offset the expenses for the creation and dissemination of the information. A widespread
inability of dotcoms to profitably offer purely informational content over the Internet speaks for itself. This is particularly striking
in the light of the often-repeated argument that information is nonrival, i.e., due to its generally very low cost of reproduction,
more than one agent is able to observe at the same time essentially the same realization of the same informative signal (e.g., the
report of a news event or a current stockmarket price). From such an observation, each agent then draws conclusions relating to
her respective project and adjusts her actions accordingly. Hence, depending on the differences in the projects the agents pursue,
their levels of confidence in the observed signal in terms of providing decision-relevant information about an uncertain future
payoff are generally varied.
One can think of a shared information service as an organization that is run by its members for the sole purpose of producing
information that is being used in a nonstrategic but excludable way.1  In particular, we assume that the individual members of
Weber/Shared Information Services
2The Insurance Services Office (http://www.iso.com) acts as a supplier of statistical, actuarial, underwriting, and claims information to the
property and casualty insurance industry.
3As a current example emphasizing the need for information sharing between federal agencies, consider Informationweeks call that [s]haring
data is key to antiterrorism efforts (Stahl 2001) in the wake of the September 11 attack on the World Trade Center.
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the shared information service pursue independent projects; for instance, the involved agents comprise only a small portion of
a common market, in which they do not have market power or they act in different fields. There are many concrete examples of
nonstrategic shared information services, such as the Aviation Weather Forecast, the Insurance Services Office,2 networked
medical expert and knowledge-base systems, any type of member-operated information- or news-aggregation networks, and
national agencies with a common set of objectives.3  We allow for the possibility of customization or versioning of the information
(Shapiro and Varian 1998): the precise observation of the signal may be different from agent to agent; moreover, even the signal
itself may be different across users. For instance, queries to a common database input by different users corresponding to their
individual needs yield different informative signals, even though the underlying information resource is shared.
The economic incentives for setting up and using shared information services stem from economies of scale and scope in
assembling the raw information as well as economies of specialization in generating the informative signal. The fixed cost for
the formation of an information service capable of producing signals of acceptable reliability (confidence) is often too high for
any single firm, which calls for group action and a contractual bargaining solution to avoid the tragedy of the commons (Liebowitz
and Margolis 1994). We thereby assume that the firms, once they decide to enter the bargaining negotiations, act rational in the
sense of Harsanyi (1966) and that the coordination of the negotiations does not pose particular problems.
Pioneering contributions in strategic information sharing have been made by Clarke (1983) and Novshek and Sonnenschein (1982)
for oligopolistic firms producing homogeneous goods (no incentive for information sharing), as well as Vives (1984) for a
differentiated Cournot duopoly (incentive for information sharing exists if the goods are complements or weak substitutes).
Raith (1996) unifies and generalizes this and most subsequent work on strategic information sharing with market interaction. As
far as we know, there exists no prior treatment of information sharing in a cooperative context in the Economics literature. In the
literature on information systems, some attention is paid to investments in cooperative interorganizational information systems.
For instance Wang and Seidmann (1995) consider the investment in an electronic data interchange (EDI) system and show that
a suppliers adoption of EDI can generate a positive externality for the buyer and negative externalities for other suppliers
(p. 401). These externalities play a role in the adoption dynamics of interorganizational systems (Riggins et al. 1994). A question
untouched by Wang and Seidman and other authors in this area is precisely how the investment for shared information systems
should be distributed between the different users, based on the decision value of the information. Our goal here is to derive
efficient investment sharing rules, based on cooperative bargaining. We thereby model explicitly the information to be shared as
a signal that is imperfectly correlated with a decision makers uncertain investment payoff. Nash (1953) founded the field of
cooperative bargaining theory, showing that, based on a number of axioms, a unique solution can be obtained that implements
a Pareto-optimal allocation. A good overview is provided by Roth (1979). In particular, we focus on the following two research
questions: 
1. Given that a number of economic agents (e.g., firms, federal agencies, or individuals) may experience a benefit from setting
up a shared information service, how much should each one contribute financially, and how much is the overall venture
worth? An answer to this question can serve as an upper bound for what could be charged by, say, a monopolist information
provider to that same group of agents, and we will compare both cases. In the first case, firms are assumed to cooperatively
bargain about the share of the implementation cost; in the second case, a monopolist information provider maximizes his
profits if he decides to enter. Naturally, the cooperative bargaining solution outperforms the monopolistic solution, if, of
course, its efficiency in actually providing and disseminating the information is the same as for the monopolist.
2. What are the conditions for existence of shared information services? We provide explicit expressions for the critical mass
of users that is necessary to form an information network, both in the cooperative and the monopolistic situation. We
introduce the notion of a critical Nash network size, which counts the smallest subset of agents that can create a shared
information network subject to each agent being at least as well off as without the information.
The outline of this paper is as follows.  In the next section, we give an exact definition of the value of information in terms of the
compensating variation of the agents utility that makes her indifferent between acquiring the informative signal or not. A
definition of the value of information as compensating variation was first introduced by Kihlstrom (1974) in a product-
consumption setting and by Treich (1997) for a standard portfolio investment problem. Although not widely spread, this definition
Weber/Shared Information Services
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is superior to what is commonly used in the Economics literature, since it takes full account of all wealth effects. We also compare
the general effect of the number of participants on the cost of a shared information service, depending on its cost characteristics.
In section 3, we determine what each participant should pay as a result of a cooperative bargaining process and how the cost for
setting up a shared information service varies with the size of its membership body and associated network externalities.
Subsequently we compare this to what a monopolist can charge in terms of an ultimatum offer, and we discuss the sources of
inefficiency. Section 5 concludes the paper with directions for future research.
2 THE VALUE OF INFORMATION
In the traditional Economics literature, the value of information to a particular agent is assessed, depending on the agents risk
posture, using two different methods (Athey 2000; Marschak and Miyasawa 1968; Raiffa and Schlaifer 1961):  (1) for risk-neutral
agents, the information value is determined as the difference between the optimal payoff with information and the optimal
default (or no-information) payoff; (2) for risk-averse agents, the cost of an informative signal is typically modeled as a utility
cost, which is subtracted from the agents full-information utility, as if the amount for the information was paid out of a separate
budget.  These two common approaches to computing the value of information typically neglect the effect the payment itself has
on the agents budget set and thereby on constraining her feasible actions.  Such wealth effects are, as should be expected, of
considerable relevance at least in a portion of the wealth domain, irrespective of the assumed risk-aversion characteristics. Also,
wealth effects cannot generally be eliminated by an appropriate choice of a class of utility functions possessing multiplicative
or additive separability properties (such as those of constant absolute risk aversion [CARA] as is often claimed). We demonstrate
below, using CARA utilities, that wealth effects are significant when the agents risk aversion, her endowed wealth, or her project
risk is relatively small or her confidence in the information is extremely high.
As a consequence, the value of information needs to be carefully defined, taking into account the exact contractual terms
governing the transfer of information from the seller to the agent. We define the monetary value or willingness to pay (WTP) for
information in terms of Hicks (1939) measure of welfare change, as the compensating variation that moves the agents expected
utility with information to the same level as without information. To simplify the analytical treatment and segregate the pure
value of information from any specific decision situation as far as possible, we will assume here that a noncontingent fixed
payment p for an informative signal (correlated with the exogenous payoff-relevant random event  is to be made before anys~ x~
uncertainty is resolved, and that neither the agents actions nor her ex-post wealth are contractible.
More specifically, we consider an agent that has the option to invest a portion  a , [0,1] of her endowed wealth w > 0 into a project
of risky return . The agents preferences are supposed to be representable by a smooth utility function  that is strictlyx~ RR →:u
increasing and concave. The agents optimal default or no-information strategy,
(1)( )[ ],)~1(maxarg ]1,0[ xawuEâ xa +∈ ∈
exists by virtue of u being continuous over the compact action set [0,1] (applying Weierstrass Theorem) and is unique, since u
is concave and strictly monotonic (i.e., one-to-one). The agent can now improve her default utility, 
(2)( )[ ],)~1()( xâwuEwd x +=
from this project at least weakly by observing a random signal , correlated with , before choosing her optimal state-contingents~ x~
action,
(3)( )( )[ ],|)~1)((maxarg ]1,0[ sxapwuEâ xas +−∈ ∈
where p represents the price of the signal. The agents expected utility with information, v, as a function of her investable wealth
w - p is therefore . Hence we define the value of information for this agent as the( )( )[ ][ ]sxâpwuEEpwv sxs ~|)~1)(()( +−=−
compensating variation  that makes her indifferent between observing the signal or not, p
(4))()( wdpwv =−
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4To simplify the analysis, we assume that this investment has to be fully committed to ex ante, even though in reality it could be spread over
time, realizing a real option value of flexibility through chunkification of the investment.
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In other words,  is the highest amount that this agent would be willing to pay for obtaining the right to observe a realizationp
of the signal  prior to choosing her optimal action (see Figure 1).s~
Figure 1.  WTP Is Defined as the Compensating Variation  in (4)p
3 COOPERATIVE INFORMATION SERVICES
We consider now the situation where N+1 agents bargain about their respective contributions, t0,...,tN, to a fixed net present
investment F(N) that is needed to set up a shared member-operated information service.4  This shared service would allow each
agent to observe a signal correlated with her respective uncertain future payoff. We examine at first the value of the information
service to a single user with CARA utility. Then we analyze the cost structure of a shared information service, which may give
rise to both a critical mass and a maximal carrying capacity, imposing a lower and (possibly) upper bound on the size of the
information network. At last we provide a characterization of the Nash bargaining solution and examine the resulting efficient
cost sharing and membership policies.
3.1 Value of the Information Service to a Single User
Let us focus on the case, where a given user has a CARA utility for wealth w of the form  and faces the)exp()( wwu ρ−−=
decision to allocate a fraction a , [0,1] of her wealth into a risky project of return . This return is assumed to be normallyx~
distributed with mean : and variance F2, and her expected utility, given that she invests aw and retains (1-a)w, is 
(5)
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5The [@][0,1]  operator is defined for any  as , truncating the value of " to the admissible intervalR∈α { }{ } ( )+== },1min{,1min,0max][ ]1,0[ aaα
[0,1].
6We denote by s a particular realization of the signal .s~
7This adjustment is additive but not linear, since it occurs inside the [@][0,1] operator.
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so that we obtain the unique no-information maximizer5
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Now the agent observes the signal = + , where  is uncorrelated with  and normally distributed with mean zero ands~ x~ ε~ ε~ x~
variance . The positive constant , corresponding to the inverse of the variance of , represents in Bayesian terms theκ/1 κ ε~
confidence (or precision) with which the signal informs the decision-maker about the realization of the exogenous random variable
. Using Bayes rule, one can compute the probability density of |s,6 which is again normally distributed with mean x~ x~
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The posterior mean  is a weighted average of signal realization s and prior mean :. The relative weight of s is increasing[ ]sxE |~
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which can be maximized with respect to a as before in (5) to yield the optimal state-contingent policy 
(10).
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Note that âs adjusts the default strategy â in (6) with the additive state-contingent term , so that the investment intensity( )ws ρκ /
is increased, iff the observation s is positive.7  Hence the investor only reduces her investment in the risky asset if she receives
unambiguous bad news, i.e., iff s < 0, which has a relatively low probability of occurrence.  The correction of the default
action â is proportional to the investors confidence in the signal, , and inversely proportional to her Arrow-Pratt risk-aversionκ
parameter D.  As her risk aversion increases, the investor gets more reluctant to adjust her default action, and consequently the
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8In fact, the signal is most valuable to a risk-neutral investor who aggressively adjusts the investment policy to âs ,{0,1}.
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information contained in the observation loses value.8  The agents indirect utility contingent on the observation s is therefore
(using (10)) 
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agent invests respectively all or none of her wealth in the risky asset. In expectation, the agent obtains 
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where we have set   and .  Provided that both : and w are large enough, there is a veryλ κσ= +1 2 [ ]v w E v ws s( ) ( )=
simple approximate solution, since then the interval [,] comprises most of the probability mass. When concentrating on
observations s plus or minus three standard deviations, , around the prior mean :, more than 99 percent of theκσ /13 2 +±
probability mass is concentrated in the critical interval [ , ] and we can approximate, s s
(12),
1
)()(
2κσ+
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and from there compute the agents WTP, , for the signal by comparing  to her utility of the no-information strategy,p )( pwv −
d(w), which yields 
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9Note that in this approximation we have effectively eliminated the dependence on the agents wealth w in the expression for her WTP (13),
but under condition (14) this approximation is justified. 
10The cost function  is assumed to be smooth with c' > 0 and c(0) = 0.RR →:c
2002  Twenty-Third International Conference on Information Systems 215
A sufficient condition for the validity of this approximation is 
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guaranteeing an error in probability weight of less than one percent. This approximate solution is not valid if (1) endowed wealth
w is small, (2) signal confidence  is very high, or (3) the agent is almost risk-neutral (D close to zero), since then  and  willκ s s
be close, i.e., a small variation in the observation within the interval [ , ] induces a large change in the investment behavior.s s
For such cases, the exact computation of the expected utility with information needs to take into account all terms as determined
in (11)9 (see Figure 2).
Figure 2.  The WTP  Can Be Approximated for w Large Enough by (13)p
(Not Possible for Perfect Information)
Special Case:  Perfect Information ( ). Then  =  = 0 and the approximation (12) is not valid.  From (11) we obtain∞→κ s s
the value of perfect information, 
(15)( ) ( ) ( )[ ],2/)(exp)(1)0()( 22 wwwFFewv w σρµρρσρκ −−−+−= −∞→
which defines an upper bound for the value of any signal. It depends strongly on the wealth of the investor and is naturally zero
for w=0. No information service can rationally charge more for its information than is implied by (15) combined with (4).
3.2 Cost of Shared Information Provision
We suppose that the cost of the information network F(N) contains a fixed portion F0, independent of the number of users
participating in the shared information service, and a variable component c(N) that is strictly increasing in N.10  If we further
Weber/Shared Information Services
11If , then , i.e., the shared information service stands no chance of creation, unless in some way (through additionalp>γ ∞=cN
assumptions)  increases in N. This could be the case as additional members create positive network externalities on other members byp
contributing information valuable to everyone.
12There may also exist negative network externalities, where the average confidence in the signal decreases as more and more agents join the
shared information network, because of aggregation effects that decrease the customization value of the signal or because of strategic interaction
between agents.
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assume for simplicity that the users of the information service are identical and each have a WTP of , as determined in (4),0Fp <
then for a rational creation of the service we need 
(16)pNNcFNF )1()()( 0 +≤+=
If the variable component is linear, c = ( N for some nonnegative constant , then the critical mass of users Nc can bep<γ
computed explicitly,11
(17).0 γ−
−
=
p
pF
N c
If the variable cost component c is strictly concave in N (i.e., c'' < 0, due, for instance, to economies of scale), then there always
exists a finite critical mass. The critical mass decreases if  is increasing in N due to positive network externalitiesp
(cf. footnote 11).12   On the other hand, if c contains convexities (i.e., c'' > 0 somewhere), these may be balanced by the growth
of  in N so that even with high fixed cost and increasing complexity in maintaining a shared information network, there)(Np
may still exist a finite critical mass above which the investment in this shared venture is viable. Figure 3 provides an overview.
A maximum carrying capacity can arise in the case of convex costs (c'' > 0) if c >  from some N on, since then each newp
member of the information service is willing to contribute less than the community has to pay for adding her.
Figure 3.  Critical Mass of the Shared Information Network as a Function of Agents
Willingness to Pay and Different Marginal Cost Functions
Weber/Shared Information Services
13It may appear unrealistic that any of the players could carry so much weight as to stop the formation of the shared information service.
However, the preceding remarks should clarify that this does not generally happen, given the assumption that the players have agreed to bargain
about their contribution in the first place. Individual rationality will generally prevent firms from carrying out their threat, which is a mere
modeling device to support the efficiency achieved by the Nash bargaining solution (cf. also footnote 16). If a particular member indeed decided
to exit the N-firm bargaining, negotiations would subsequently resume with N-1 firms.
14Each agent  is only observing her own customized signal .Ii ∈ is~
15We further assume that all of the projects payoffs are uncorrelated and that the agents do not form coalitions.
16The Pareto-optimality axiom can be relaxed to mere individual rationality as shown by Roth (1977).  In that case, the solution comprises
the Nash solution and the default option d.
17Nash (1953) shows this only for two players. The generalization to N players (without coalitions) is trivial as Roth (1979) points out.
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3.3 The Bargaining Problem
In this section, we derive an efficient apportioning of the cost of the shared information service among its members. Assume that
there are N+1 agents that are willing to bargain about their contributions , whereNttt ,...,, 10
(18)).(
0
NFt
N
i
i =∑
=
The bargaining solution is chosen here as the benchmark of what can be achieved using a coordinated approach to the shared
allocation of costs to the members of a shared information network. Harsanyi (1966) notes that such [a] cooperative game can
always be replaced by a noncooperative game if we incorporate promises and threats in the strategies available to the players
(p. 616). The threats in the cooperative negotiation game correspond to the players ability to interrupt the bargaining process by
forcing the default outcome, an extreme action that is not generally individually rational (cf. Roth 1977) given that entry into the
bargaining round was free.13  More specifically, we assume that each agent  has an endowed wealth of ,{ }NIi ,...,1,0=∈ 0>iw
is of constant absolute risk aversion with coefficient , and pursues a risky project of normal return  with mean  and0>iρ ix~ iµ
variance . Furthermore, she has confidence  in the personalized signal , where the error term  has mean2iσ 0>iκ iii xs ε
~~~ += iε
~
zero and is statistically independent from the project return .14  If the agent disagrees with a proposed outcome, she can forceix~
the default outcome  as previously determined in (2) and substituting agent is parameters. The compact, convex1)( +∈ Nii wd R
and nonempty set  contains all of the feasible utility payoff vectors for the agents in I.15  Nash (1953) defined a solution1+⊂ NS R
to the bargaining game as a function , such that b(S,d)  for all possible bargaining situations (S,d), where1: +→ NSb R S∈
d=(d0,...,dN). Given the four axioms (cf. Roth 1979, pp. 68) (1) Indepedence of Equivalent Utility Representations, (2) Symmetry,
(3) Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, and (4) Pareto Optimality,16 there exists a unique solution b, such that17
(19),)(maxarg
0
 ∏
=
≥ −=
N
i
ii dvdvv
where  and  is defined in the same manner as the expected utility for),...,,( 10 Nvvv=v [ ])()( iiissiiii twvEtwvv −=−=
the individual agent in (11). Note that the bargaining set S is defined by (18).
Proposition 1 (COOPERATIVE ALLOCATION) Consider the bargaining problem (S,d).
(i) The solution to (18)(19) is uniquely characterized by 
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18For instance, a risk-averse agent will respond less aggressively to a (imperfect) signal than a risk-neutral investor, and thus is willing to pay
less for the information.
19It turns out that an agents monetary contribution to the shared venture is U-shaped in her wealth w. For low ws her payment is decreasing
whereas for large ws it is increasing. This is due to the fact that for large ws the agents WTP for the signal is almost constant (since then the
approximation condition (14) holds) and the agents decrease in bargaining power outweighs her decrease in WTP. For low ws the converse
is true.  Bargaining power is meant here in the implicit sense of Kihlstrom et al. (1981), who showas pointed out in the main textthat
agents with lower risk aversions obtain a larger surplus in cooperative bargaining situations and therefore have a higher implicit bargaining
power.  For an explicit modeling of bargaining power, see footnote 26.
20Such strategic externalities are not necessarily negative. They tend to be positiveincreasing the incentive of industry participants to share
informationwhen firms best responses to their actions are strategic complements (cf.  Raith 1996; Vives 1984).
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(ii) If all agents have the same risk aversion D and the approximation (12)(13) holds for all i , I, , then the optimal cost sharing
for the common information service is given by 
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(iii) If the risk aversion  of agent  increases, thenall else being equalthis agents share  increases, iff jρ Ij∈ jt
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Proposition 1 characterizes the efficient Nash bargaining solution both generally (in terms of a first-order condition), and explicitly
for an important special case where all the agents risk-aversion parameters  are identical and the approximation condition (14)iρ
holds. For differing risk-aversion parameters, a general result by Kihlstrom et al. (1981) states that bargaining performance
decreases with increasing risk aversion. However, we find that the agents absolute monetary contribution to the shared
information service does not need to increase as a consequence. Indeed, the situation of information procurement produces a
countervailing effect, since the value of information generally decreases with increasing risk aversion.18  The net change of an
agents contribution is positive if and only ifas a response to an increase of her risk aversionher demand for information
decreases faster than her bargaining power relative to the other agents.19 
3.4 Effect of Network Externalities
Externalities in information networks do occur as a result of (possibly mediated) interactions of different network members. These
externalities can have both positive and negative effects on the members perceived utility. Riggins et al. (1994) examine the
growth of interorganizational systems which can be both hampered and facilitated by differences in perceived network
externalities across the different users. Positive externalities may be a result of the benefit that comes from sharing information
in a nonstrategic way insofar as it increases the signal quality of individual users. On the other hand, negative externalities can
be a consequence of high user traffic and network capacity limitations that make it harder to retrieve usable signals and thus
indirectly reduce the confidence in these signals. Negative externalities may also result from a strategic use of information by
different members of the same industry against each other.20  To incorporate such effects in our model, we assume that the firms
respective confidence  in an informative signal retrieved from the shared information service depends on the number of usersκ i
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21To keep the formalism simple, we have here implicitly assumed that the confidences and perceived network externalities are uniform across
all firms.  Of course, there is no reason for this to be true in any particular situation. In addition to a more complicated form of the expressions
for the critical mass due to aggregation of the heterogeneous firms with different quasiconcave confidences , theNiNi ,...,0),( =κ
fundamental difference is that the feasibility of the shared investment and the surplus of the different players will depend on exactly who is
bargaining and not just on the number of participants. Firm heterogeneity in perceived network effects generally results in nonmonotonic surplus
in the number of participants. To deal with full firm heterogeneity in a proper fashion, it is necessary to endogenize firm entry into the
cooperative bargaining situation, an extension that is for space constraints beyond the scope of this paper. It naturally involves determining
the fulfilled-expectations equilibria of which there may be several so that coordination and preannouncements may become important
dimensions of the problem (cf. Farrell and Saloner 1986).
22In other words, we assume here that there is an upper bound for the risk aversion, and that the N agents are uniformly distributed on the
interval [ /M, ].ρ ρ
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N of the information service. For simplicity we thereby assume that  is quasiconcave in N or in other words that0)( ≥Nκ
 is either monotonic or single-peaked in N. For any given network size N, the results of the previous sections remain)(Nκ
unaffected; however, incorporating (possibly strategic) network effects may have a dramatic effect on the critical mass and maxi-
mum carrying capacity of the shared information network. Under the assumption that (14) holds, we obtain, by combining (13)
with (16), for the critical mass under network externalities:21
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For the simple case of a linear network cost expansion path with , one can directly see that any strict increase NNc γ=)( κκ >
yields a (weak) decrease in the critical mass, as the right-hand side of (17) is strictly decreasing in  which in turn is strictlyp
increasing in . This naturally generalizes to any network cost function considered in the previous section. For convex c, theκ
quasiconcavity of  ensures that the critical mass in (24) is unique. )(⋅κ
3.5 Efficient Cost Sharing and Membership Policies
The Nash bargaining solution is efficient provided that all of the bargaining members need to either agree on a common resource
allocation or force the disagreement outcome d (also sometimes appropriately referred to as the threat point, cf. footnote 13).
A sequential enlargement of the membership body does not fulfill this requirement; and naturally the existing members wish to
enlarge their user base such that each of their contributions are nonincreasing, which may result in the exclusion of certain agents,
if they did not belong to the original network.
4 MONOPOLIST INFORMATION SERVICES
4.1 Pricing and Network Size
Consider now a monopolist that decides about entering a market to sell customized information to a potential client base of M
agents. We assume that each agent  disposes about enough wealth and is sufficiently risk averse, so that (14) holds},...,1{ Mm ∈
and each agents reservation price is given by (13). Agents are heterogeneous in their risk aversions, , whereMρρρ ,...,, 21
 and  is a positive constant.22  Corresponding to these different risk aversions are the reservation pricesMmm /ρρ = ρ
, where by (13) and by the definition of  we have Mppp <⋅⋅⋅<< 21 mρ
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23In that sense the information is horizontally versioned in such a way that the product of confidence in the signal and variance of the risky
project is the same across all agents (i.e., if a project is more risky, then the agent can be less sure about the relevance of the signal realization,
which corresponds to the notion that the monopolist has constant marginal cost to satisfy each additional user of the information network).
24The critical Nash network size is simply the smallest subset of a given universe of agents that can individually rationally set up an information
network (of a given cost structure).
25The finite sum can also be expressed in closed form, using the relation , where  is the Digamma function,e
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Thereby we have assumed that the customization of the information is such that the risk-adjusted confidence  is constant2mmσκ
and equal to k for all m.23  If (for simplicity) the marginal cost of providing one additional agent with the customized information
is constant (i.e., ), we can provide closed-form solutions for the monopolists optimal price, optimal profits, andNNc γ=)(
market penetration. 
Proposition 2 (MONOPOLISTIC ALLOCATION) Assume that the monopolist rationally enters the market. Then the optimal price
is  and optimal profits are γ2* =p
(25),
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with a market penetration (and resulting network size) of 
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The monopolist rationally enters the market iff the critical mass  of potential users is reached ( ), so that optimalcM cMM ≥
profits  in (25) are nonnegative, where  If the monopolist enters the market (the likelihood of which*Π ).1log(/4 0 kFM c += ρ
is inversely proportional to the dispersion  in the agents risk aversions), then he in general tends to restrict the size of theρ
information network to maximize his profits. Those agents with high risk aversions also have a low WTP and are therefore
excluded from the use of the network. Especially when fixed costs F0 are high, this can lead to market failure, i.e., the monopolist
does not enter the market, even though a bargaining solution (which cross-subsidizes the low-value agents) exists, which is the
case whenever M is larger than the minimal network size, which we term the critical Nash network size.24 
Proposition 3 (WELFARE DIFFERENTIALS AND CRITICAL MASS) Assume that the approximation condition (14) is satisfied for each
agent.
(i) The total welfare achieved in a non-discriminating monopolistic environment is25
(27)
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whereas the welfare achieved in the Pareto-optimal Nash bargaining solution is given by
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26An additional hidden assumption is that the agents all have equal (explicit) bargaining power (cf. also footnote 19).  Situations with
asymmetric bargaining power can be dealt with in a manner already suggested by Nash (1953) by introducing positive exponents , iβ Ii∈
into the Nash function (19) proportional to the agents bargaining power, such that . This modification makes theNN =+⋅⋅⋅++ βββ 21
models prescribed sharing rule potentially contentious whenever not all s are equal to one. iβ
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(ii) The critical number of potential users of the monopoly shared information service, , and the critical Nash network size cM cN
are related as follows: 
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(iii) The critical Nash network size  is the smallest possible network size of any shared information network that guaranteescN
individually rational membership, in particular . cc MmN ≤≤ *
For small marginal costs (, the critical Nash network size is less than half as large as , since using (29) we have then: cM
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However,  just represents the consumer base necessary for the monopolist to serve this heterogeneous market. The actual sizecM
of the monopolists network, , is smaller than that. But still joining the network has to be for each user individually rational,*m
not allowing for a cross-subsidization of low-value agents by high-value agents, as is generally the case with a Pareto-optimal
bargaining outcome.
4.2 Sources of Inefficiency
The monopolistic solution is market based, unlike the bargaining equilibrium, which presupposes that each player is telling the
truth about her confidence in the signal and that there is common knowledge about the utility functions. In practical situations,
an efficiency loss due to asymmetries in the information can be expected, but nevertheless if all parties can agree on their
respective parameter vectors  and costs for the service are known to be of the form (16), then any disagreements),,,( σµκρ
about splitting the investment burden F are resolved by the cooperative allocation described in Proposition 1.26  Thus, even though
there is a nominal efficiency loss by implementing the market-based solution, it may actually be preferable whenever the expected
differences in welfare are small.
5 DISCUSSION
We have examined shared information services from both a cooperative bargaining viewpoint and the perspective of a monopolist
supplier. To approximate the efficient outcome generated by Nash bargaining, the pricing of information should be contingent
on the agents confidence in the signal, her project risk, and her risk aversion. Even though each agents demand for information
decreases as her risk aversion increases, in a cooperative bargaining situation her contribution share may actually increase, an
effect that a market-based mechanism implemented by a monopolistic information supplier cannot exploit. We have also shown
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that wealth effects are significant for low-wealth agents, due to the strong impact of a prepayment on their investable wealth. This
suggests that pricing should be significantly different for agents with a low endowed wealth, but should be essentially independent
of wealth after a certain threshold (given by condition (14)) is reached. We also discussed the critical mass of users necessary
for the creation of shared information services in the presence of network externalities. Clearly any prospective information
provider or cooperating group of agents should verify that they meet these minimum requirements before setting up the
information service in order to avoid failure. We identified the ingredients of an efficient pricing scheme and a (future) manager
of a shared information service network, given that it is somehow possible to isolate the salient agent characteristics (e.g., their
confidence in the informative signal), knows how an efficient pricing scheme can be structured to maximize welfare orin the
case of monopolistic information provisionprofits.
Future theoretical contributions could evolve along the following three axes:  (1) to endogenize entry in the presence of
uncertainty about the costs of the shared information network and examine the associated fulfilled-expectations equilibria; (2) to
examine monopolistic information selling mechanisms that involve various screening techniques based on versioning; (3) to
introduce informational asymmetries in the bargaining solution to capture parameter uncertainty and differences in bargaining
power among the agents.
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Appendix:  Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. (i) Define  for all . Then using (18) the first-order optimality conditions for the)()( iiiii twvtu −= Ii∈
problem (19) can be written as27
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where we have set the qis as in the proposition. From the last relation we can conclude using (21) that 
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Summing up the tjs from 1 through to N one obtains t0 as given in the proposition. Substituting this expression for t0 into (31)
we obtain (22).  (iii) If we substitute (21) into the first-order condition (20) and differentiate both sides (totally) with respect to jρ
(j > 0 without loss of generality) we obtain (using the abbreviation  as above)28)()( iiiii twvtu −=
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(32)
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It can be readily verified that the bracketed expression on the LHS of (32) is always negative, so that the sign of tj' depends solely
on the sign of the numerator on the RHS, characterized by (23). QED
Proof of Proposition 2. The monopolists profit function is 
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where 1 denotes the indicator function. Since there are only a finite number of agents, maximizing profits is equivalent to finding
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which yields (26) as the unique solution. Hence the optimal price is  and profits are given by (25). QEDγ2* =p
Proof of Proposition 3. (i) Let us first compute the consumer surplus in the monopolistic situation, 
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where the last inequality binds, whenever the unconstrained solution of (33) lies inside [0,M], i.e., whenever the monopolist
actively excludes potential users from the network. Adding CS in (34) and (25) we obtain the expression (27). On the other hand,
the welfare  (in monetary terms) for the Pareto-optimal case can begiven that the approximation condition (14) holdssimply
determined by adding up the WTPs (13) over all agents i=1,...,N, and subtracting the cost of the network , NF γ+0
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as long as  and zero otherwise, which yields (28). (ii) The critical number  of potential users of the monopolisticcNN ≥ cM
network have been computed in the main text exactly offsetting the monopolists total cost. The Nash network size is analogously
determined by setting  to zero. From this, equation (29) follows directly. (iii) Clearly, since the Nash bargaining solution isW
welfare maximizing, and at  each agent is as low in her utility that removing a single agent would prompt at least one usercN
to force the default outcome d. QED
